Tech-Writer.net > Photography > Aerial Reconnaissance and Imagery Analysis > Drones, RPVs, UAVs & UCAVs > Selected Programs > U.S. Army Aquila

Photography > Aerial Reconnaissance and Imagery Analysis > Drones, RPVs, UAVs & UCAVs > Selected Programs

U.S. Army Aquila - Technology Demonstrator

Background
In June, 1975, after four years service in Germany with an Army MIBARS unit involved in tactical aerial reconnaissance (duty at Zweibrucken AFB, 38th TRS), I was assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ, Combat Developments, as the Center's R&D Project Officer for the Army RPV Program. This is where I became involved with RPVs and Lockheed's Aquila RPV specifically, which was the Army's System Technology Demonstration (STD). We considered and reviewed the capabilities of many of the vehicles available or in development as potential alternatives, but the focus was to the Aquila system - for good reason.

The Aquila was a very sophisticated, state-of-the-art design with substantial potential for long-term development and adaptation. The recovery system was arguably the weak link in the system, but that would have been reconciled had there not been other, non-system related issues from the start.

Discussion of Program & Environment
Management of the program was the critical weakness even during these early days in the STD phase. There was rampant parochialism among the TRADOC centers, aviators opposed to the RPV due their concern about the impact it would have on future (manned) Army aerial reconnaissance platform programs, and petty rivalries not relevant to the program’s objective. By late-1977, it was clear to me these factors, couple with (apparently) inevitable and pervasive mission creep, would be instrumental in the program’s failure.

It’s important to remember the original concept for this early program was a relatively low-cost (expendable) mini-RPV for battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. The basis for the Aquila development effort was exactly on point:

Adjunct to the Aquila project was the advanced imaging sensors program for the Army’s manned OV-1 Mohawk. There were three requirements identified for this platform, each of which would also be a part of the proposed follow-on aircraft. The Bell tilt-rotor was the leading contender for the successor for the OV-1. It is probably unnecessary to mention the attitude of the aviator lobby toward the RPVs. AVSCOM and the aviator community were not enthusiastic about the RPV program. An interesting side note to this opposition is the Air Force is currently using qualified pilots to “fly” operational UAVs.

Lockheed faced some challenges during the STD phase, not the least being three crashes I observed and a “retrieval” (recovery) system that was a test at best, i.e., fly the “bird” into a (relatively) small net. I suspect the idea for this net recovery system may have been derived from an earlier (Lockheed) development program, one I believe may have been in testing on the Huachuca Test Ranges before Aquila. (Has anyone seen a fully miniaturized 6-cylinder Lycoming aircraft engine?) Lockheed had to go back to the proverbial drawing board a couple of times, but managed to weather the early mishaps.

The early portion of the Aquila STD effort was managed through the Intelligence Center, a logical decision given the intelligence and target acquisition role. As I mentioned, Aquila’s sensor had a laser target designator, allowing acquired targets to be “lighted” for engagement by either laser-guided bombs or the Army’s developmental Cannon-Launched Guided Projectile (CLGP, pronounced Clig-up). This feature prompted an intense debate over which branch of the Army – Intelligence or Artillery – should control and operate the system. Naturally, the combat arms branch easily won – right or wrong. This was not an optimal program decision. The rest is history.

During the STD program, we considered the capabilities of a broad range of the then available or emerging RPVs. USAF had the Compass Cope program, what we called a maxi-class RPV, and there was an interesting proposal to adapt this platform for the mission of the OV-1D, but adopting an advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Included with this proposal was a drawing of a “Cope” with a cockpit (would you believe?). The proposal received little support, of course, but this platform was ideally suited for the advanced radar system and the standoff imaging sensor system (SISS). The latter, conceptually, was to be a near real time, long focal length electro-optic imaging sensor (IR) with downlink. A Cope-like platform provided the mission profile and endurance envisioned for this sensor and the advanced radar system. There was never serious consideration by decision makers, for a host of reasons. One thing that has always stayed with me about this proposal: 12 Cope vehicles could have met the Army’s worldwide, 24/7 aerial reconnaissance and surveillance requirements, and done it even in 0/0 take-off/landing conditions. Better yet, no lives at risk.

Aquila was meant to be a purely tactical resource, say at brigade or division level, and with due diligence and focus it would have served that mission and requirements well - even been well ahead of its time. It did not offer the mission endurance for surveillance in the classic sense, although the mission creepers and ASA/NSA community sought to have a variety of SIGINT /COMINT packages added or available. I thought the COPE/Aquila combination would have been an outstanding resource, but, then, I wasn't on the bandwagon for much increased (near total) reliance on national-level resources that was the "in" thing at the time. As with COPE and Aquila, a suite of collection resources made much more sense, but that was hardly a popular position at the time and assuredly not where the money was going.

Although more than a decade later, events during Desert Storm emphasized the need for dedicated theater and tactical resources, effectively moving it from "opinion" to fact, and stirring reactivation of some resources (SR-71) and more focus on others - including UAVs. The UAVs had by this time demonstrating their potential in real world situations, like with the Israelis (Beka Valley), and our experience later with the Predator UAV. So, the concept that was the genesis for Aquila has been proven, and the UAV has now moved into the mainstream.

For clarification I need to mention RPVs are no longer RPVs? They're now Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and we even have the emergence of another category of UAVs - armed vehicles called UCAVs. Arming these vehicles is not a new concept. There was consideration of the idea as early as 1976, and attempts to arm drones long before that, though the efforts were limited to "dumb" ordinance.

As an aside note to the period, the SAM/AAA threat was of grave concern, but much of the focus involved trying to keep a human being in the cockpit. At times, it was almost humorous how far this went. Then there were the other gambits, some near lunacy. Consider the mindless idea to mount an APS-94 on a Huey helicopter. – called the Stand-off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS). This was a real winner! Imagine a UH-1 flying 15-30 kilometers (9-18 miles) from the FEBA with a huge APS-94 antenna hanging underneath it, radiating a brute force radar signal that screamed SHOT AT ME! I always thought SOTAS meant Shoot Off The Antenna, Stupid! Mindless as it was, it had the “support” of an Assistance Secretary of the Army and was kept alive – no pun intended, of course. I think it was another one of those personal career advancement things, not necessarily in the best interests of the Army or the taxpayers, but undoubtedly it paid off – for someone, in some way.